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Abstract
Theory: Contemporary theories of presidential election outcomes, especially the economic
voting and spatial issue voting models, are used to examine voter choice in the 1996
presidential election.
Hypotheses: First, we look at the eects of voter perceptions of the national economy
on voter support for Clinton. Second we look at the eects of candidate and voter
positions on ideology and on a number of issues. Last, we examine whether respondents'
views on other issues | social issues such as abortion as well as issues revolving around
entitlements and taxation that were emphasized by the campaigns | played signicant
roles in this election.
Methods: Multinomial probit analysis of the 1996 National Election Studies data; sim-
ulations based on counterfactual scenarios based on dierent macroeconomic conditions
and dierent issue platforms of candidates.
Results: The eects of economic perceptions are much greater than the eects of voter
issue positions on the election outcome. Some social issues, namely abortion, did play
a role in determining the election outcome. The presence of a third centrist candidate
limited the ability of other candidates to improve their vote shares by moving in the issue
space.
Economics, Entitlements and Social Issues: Voter
Choice in the 1996 Presidential Election

R. Michael Alvarez Jonathan Nagler
1 Introduction
For almost the last half{century, academic interest has focused on the determinants
of presidential election outcomes. In general, both scholarly and popular discussions
of presidential election outcomes has focused on three causal factors: the state of the
economy, the positions of voters and candidates on the issues, and on the ability of
candidates to conduct eective campaigns for oce. In this paper we seek to understand
how these dierent factors account for the outcome of the 1996 presidential election; in
turn, this will better help in our general understanding of how voters make their decisions
in American presidential elections.
In recent years, much interest has focused on the importance of the national economy
as a signicant factor in accounting for both the success of three Republican presidential
candidates during the 1980's as well as Bill Clinton's rst victory in 1992 (Alvarez and
Nagler 1995; Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983; Markus 1988; Rosenstone 1983; Tufte 1978).
But at the same time, many in academic and popular circles have pointed to a number of
non{economic factors as potentially important features of presidential politics. For ex-
ample, in recent years social issues may have risen in importance as factors in presidential
politics, most especially the issues of abortion and voter anger with Washington and the
federal government. Social issues are not new to American presidential elections; George
McGovern was tagged with the `3 A's' | Amnesty, Abortion, and Acid | in 1972. But
what is perhaps new are the organizational resources devoted to social issues associated
with the rise of the right{wing of the Republican party. Contrasting the cultural set of
social issues, in the 1990s the Democrats adopted a strategy of trying to make entitlement
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programs an issue: arguing to voters that Republicans would eliminate or severely curtail
Medicare and Social Security if given the opportunity. In addition to specic issues, the
more general notions of liberal and conservative ideology have been seen as important
issues in presidential campaigns since Ronald Reagan ran on an ideological position dis-
tinct from his opponent. Since then presidential elections have featured George Bush's
attacks on Michael Dukakis's liberalism in the 1988 campaign and Clinton's more recent
\New Democratic" ideology. So there are strong reasons to believe that both issues and
ideology were important factors in the 1996 presidential election as they have been in
previous elections (Abramson et al. 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994; Carmines and Stimson 1980;
Jackson 1975; Key 1966; Page and Brody 1972; Pomper 1972).
While it is important to understand the relative impacts of economics, issues and
ideology in particular presidential elections, having a general sense of which factors tend
to matter most in voter decision rules can produce normative conclusions about the
quality of voter decisions and whether politicians face serious constraints while in oce.
Judgments about presidential candidates based on retrospective economic concerns might
be seen as employing objective and tangible information. However, if presidents have little
control over short-term macroeconomic importance, retrospective economic evaluations
might be poor decision criteria for voters to employ in electoral choice if their goal is to
insure outcomes they desire. Thus, if voters are using economic criteria and not issue
or ideological information in their decisions, candidates might be allowed much more
exibility in their future policymaking activities than voters would like them to have.
Another reason we nd the 1996 presidential race to be of particular interest is the
presence of Ross Perot as a non{major party candidate. While in 1992 Perot received
almost 20% of the popular vote, in 1996 his popular vote was cut in half. Despite a num-
ber of accounts for Perot's showing in the 1992 election (Abramson et al. 1995; Alvarez
and Nagler 1995; Zaller and Hunt 1994), it is important to determine what factors drove
Perot's support to less than 10% in 1996. Studying presidential elections when there
are three potentially viable candidates is both theoretically and methodologically chal-
lenging. A three{candidate presidential race is more dicult to model theoretically and
empirically since the assumptions in both the standard two{candidate theoretical mod-
els of elections and the simple methodological techniques used to study two{candidate
races (usually logit or probit models) may be incorrect and inferences drawn from them
could be error{prone. The retrospective model of voting can be inadequate if it does not
allow us to predict which of the two non{incumbent parties a voter will choose. Here we
use a relatively new methodological technique, multinomial probit, to study this three{
candidate race which minimizes the restrictive assumptions we need to make in order to
estimate a model of voter choice.
In this paper we examine three sets of explanations for the outcome of the 1996
presidential election campaign. First, we look at the eects of voter perceptions of the
national economy on voter support for Clinton. Second we look at the eects of candidate
and voter positions on ideology and on a number of issues on support for the candidates.
Third, we seek to understand whether voters' positions on other issues | social issues
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such as abortion as well as issues revolving around entitlements and taxation that were
the focus of indirect and direct campaign strategies | played signicant roles in this
election. Thus this work extends the work of Alvarez and Nagler (1995) and enriches
it with analysis of a more comprehensive set of issues. In the end, we are able to pull
together each of these dierent sets of explanations into a consistent analysis of the 1996
presidential election which shows why Clinton won this race, and which also helps us
understand why it was that both Dole and Perot fell so far from electoral victory. This
allows us to more fully understand the relative importance of economics and issues in
determining presidential election outcomes.
2 A First Look at the Data
Before turning to a multivariate analysis of voter choice in the 1996 presidential election,
we rst present the choices made by voters amongst the three major candidates, broken
down by several important factors. Then we turn to a simple presentation of ideological
positioning data which is designed to examine the support in the survey data for the
idea that Clinton's ideological stance as a \New Democrat" was important. In Table 1
we provide a simple crosstabulation showing the relationship between support for each
of the three major candidates (Perot, Dole, and Clinton) and the voters' perceptions
of the economy, their partisanship, gender and past voting behavior. We also examine
the bivariate relationship between candidate support and a number of measures of voter
preferences on social and entitlement issues. The data is from the 1996 American National
Election Study (Rosenstone, Kinder, and Miller 1996).
Table 1 Goes Here
We rst examine the voters' perceptions of both their own personal nances and the
national economy in the past year and how that is related to their candidate preferences.
1
First, of those voters who thought their own personal nancial situation had worsened in
the past year, most were Dole supporters (47%) but not by a great margin over Clinton,
since 44% of those who believed their own nancial situation had worsened over the past
year voted for Clinton. This low margin is interesting because Clinton was much more
successful with this group of voters in his 1992 challenge. Clinton received the votes of
58.1% of voters who felt the economy was worse o in 1992, while Bush retained only
21.5% of these voters (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). When we look to the voters who found
that their personal nancial situation had improved in the past year we see they are over-
whelming supporters of Clinton (62%). Second, the eects of retrospective evaluations of
the national economy seem to have an even stronger eect on candidate preference than
do retrospective evaluations of personal nances in Table 1, which is consistent with the
conventional wisdom (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). We see that those voters who believed
that the national economy had grown much worse in the past year were very likely to be
Dole voters (57%) and even a sizable number of these voters supported Perot (13%). The
situation reverses itself when we look to those who believed that the national economy
had gotten better in the past year: fully 71% of those voters supported Clinton, 23%
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supported Dole, and only 6% supported Perot. Therefore, from these simple bivariate
comparisons we have strong support for the hypothesis that perceptions of the national
economy and a voter's personal nancial condition were important determinants of voter
choice in this presidential election.
We provide next in Table 1 the breakdown of vote choice based on partisanship, past
political participation, and gender. Not surprisingly, professed Republicans were strong
supporters of Dole (79%); however 21% of the stated Republicans \defected" to support
Clinton (14%) or Perot (7%). Clinton was not only able to draw signicant support from
stated Republicans, but he was able to keep Democrats from \defecting" to a much larger
extent | Clinton received the votes of 88% of the Democrats in our sample, a full nine
percent lower defection rate than Dole could maintain. This was also 18% higher than
Bush's retention rate of Republicans in 1992 when only 70% of Republicans voted for
Bush (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). Last, while stated independents roughly split between
Clinton and Dole, many independents (20%) supported Perot's third party candidacy.
One popular account for the role of third party candidates is that they serve to
mobilize disaected citizens who would otherwise tend to stay home on election day. We
nd little support for any sort of strategic mobilization eect on new voters by Perot. Of
those who did not vote in the 1992 presidential election, but voted in 1996, most actually
supported Clinton (58%). This is actually higher than Clinton's 53% rate of support
among those who had voted in 1992. Thus it seems that as in the 1992 election, Perot
did not mobilize large groups of alienated and disaected voters to enter the political
process.
Next, evidence for the well{documented gender gap in support for presidential candi-
dates is provided in Table 1. Male voters were slightly more inclined to support Clinton
than Dole (a dierence of roughly 2%). But female voters were vastly more likely to vote
for Clinton than for Dole, with 60% of the females in our sample supporting Clinton and
only 34% supporting Dole. This gender gap of 24.1% could have been driven largely by
the dierences in preferences on social and economic issues, and probably by dierences
in partisanship, between men and women (Chaney et al. 1997). Men were slightly more
likely to vote for Perot than women, continuing a pattern observed in the 1992 election
(Alvarez and Nagler 1995).
Next we provide the breakdown of candidate support by respondents' positions on
three important issues where the major candidates had clearly distinct positions: abor-
tion, welfare and social security cuts. We see in Table 1 that pro{life voters were strong
supporters of Dole (55%) while pro{choice voters were strong supporters of Clinton (68%).
This was very similar to 1992, since in that election 48% of pro{lifers supported Bush
and 57% of the pro{choice voters supported Clinton (Abramowitz 1995; Alvarez and
Nagler 1995). Perot's support does not appear to vary much among the dierent camps
of opinion. We nd similar patterns when we look at both welfare and social security
cuts: those who wished to see cuts in either entitlement program were strong supporters
of Dole (52% and 69% respectively). Those who wanted the programs increased were
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strong supporters of Clinton (84% and 66%, respectively).
One of the issues emphasized by the Dole campaign was the 15% tax cut. 67% of
those who favored at least a 15% tax cut voted for Dole. Of those who opposed such a
tax cut, most voted for Clinton (54%). Surprisingly, for a candidate who had campaigned
on the issue of the federal budget decit in the previous election, those who opposed the
15% tax cut were only slightly more likely to support Perot than those who favored the
15% tax cut.
2.1 Did the Electorate see Clinton as a Moderate?
One of the major accounts for both of Clinton's presidential election victories focuses
on the overall ideological position of the candidates. Conventional wisdom has asserted
that Clinton's eorts to dene himself and his party as \New Democrats" were largely
successful and were a large part of Clinton's ability to win in 1992 and 1996. Alvarez and
Nagler cast considerable doubt on the \New Democrat" hypothesis, largely since they
were able to show that American voters did not seem to see Clinton as an ideological
moderate (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). In Table 2 we update the data presented in Alvarez
and Nagler's 1995 paper. Here we give the mean ideological placements for voters and
the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates for 1988, 1992, 1994 and 1996.
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We also give the mean ideological placement for Perot in 1992{96. Last we compute the
average distance between the voters in our sample and each candidate.
Table 2 Goes Here
We see in the rst row of Table 2 that the American electorate in 1994 was ideologically
similar to the electorate in 1992, but the ideological distribution of voters shifts slightly
to the right in 1996. Thus, the American electorate was slightly more conservative in
1996 than in the previous two elections. Turning to the candidate's positions over these
elections, we see a remarkable amount of similarity | not change. While voters saw Bush
as slightly more liberal in 1992 than 1988, they saw Dole as slightly more conservative in
1996 than Bush. Yet since in 1996 voters were slightly more conservative than in 1992,
Dole was actually no closer or further from most voters than Bush had been in 1992.
Clinton, though, had been seen in 1992 as more liberal than Dukakis had been in
1988. After the signicant political events in the rst two years of Clinton's rst ad-
ministration, we might have expected that the voters could have learned more about
Clinton's \New Democratic" policies | and hence voters should have seen Clinton as
being more conservative in 1994 than in 1992. Yet we observe exactly the opposite in
Table 2; Clinton was seen as slightly more liberal in 1994 and 1996 than in 1992. With
the electorate becoming slightly more conservative in 1996 than in 1992, this actually
implies that Clinton was slightly further from the electorate in 1996 than he had been in
earlier elections. Thus there seems to be little support for the assertion that Clinton was
seen as a moderate, \New Democrat" since in each of the three election years 1992-1996
voters saw Clinton as more liberal than they had seen Mike Dukakis.
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In the last two rows of Table 2 we give the same information for placement of Perot.
One important observation to begin with regarding Perot's positioning is that between
1992 and 1996 he is always between Clinton and the two Republican presidential candi-
dates in the ideological space. We see a slight movement in Perot placement to the right,
between 1992 and 1996. Perot was seen as somewhat more conservative in 1996 than
in 1992. But again, since the electorate became somewhat more conservative between
1992 and 1996 as well, this means that Perot was actually in roughly the same location
relative to most voters in 1996 as he had been in 1992.
3 Multivariate Analysis of the 1996 Presidential Elec-
tion
It is impossible to dierentiate amongst the competing explanations for Clinton's 1996
reelection by looking only at bivariate relationships. To better test these dierent expla-
nations requires a multivariate methodology which will give us the ability to determine
the relative eects of respondent characteristics and candidate position on issues in a
three{candidate election. We want to use the multivariate model which imposes the
fewest restrictions; therefore we use the multinomial probit model to produce multivari-
ate estimates of the relative eects of these many dierent factors on vote choice in the
1996 presidential election (Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1997).
The multinomial probit model we use here is very similar to the model used in Alvarez
and Nagler's analysis of the 1992 election (Alvarez and Nagler 1995).
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Following standard
practice (Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1997; Hausman and Wise 1978) we dene the random
utility for each voter for the three candidates in the 1996 election as:
U
ij
= a
i
	
j
+X
ij
 + "
ij
(1)
where U
ij
is the utility of the j
th
candidate to the i
th
voter, a
i
is a vector of characteristics
unique to each individual voter i, X
ij
is a matrix of characteristics k unique to candidate
j (j = 1; 2; 3) with respect to each voter, 	
j
and  are coecient vectors and "
ij
is
a disturbance term. As is usually the case with random utility models, we assume
that individuals vote for the candidate who brings them the highest utility. Under the
multinomial probit model we assume that the three disturbance terms are distributed
multivariate normal. Last, we assume that the three diagonal elements of the error
variance{covariance matrix (the three error variances) are homoskedastic, a normalization
which allows us to estimate various remaining error covariances.
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In this multinomial probit specication, we estimate one coecient for each alter-
native characteristic; thus we estimate only one parameter for each of the issue and
ideological distance measures we have in our model. But, for individual characteris-
tics, we estimate (J   1) coecients for each characteristic, with J being the number of
choices in the model. Since there are only three choices in the model we present below,
that means we will estimate two coecient vectors. One of these sets of coecients gives
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the eect of a particular individual characteristic on the relative choice of Clinton and
Perot; the other set of coecients gives the eect of an individual characteristic on the
relative choice of Dole and Perot.
The data we use to estimate the model is the same we used in Table 1: the 1996
American National Election Study (Rosenstone, Kinder, and Miller 1996). In their work
on the 1992 election, Alvarez and Nagler were only able to operationalize ideological dis-
tance between the three candidates and each voter, since there was no issue placement
information for Perot in the 1992 study (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). In the 1996 data,
however, respondents in the rst two (of four) sample replicates were asked to place
Perot on a wide range of seven point issue scales (government services, defense spending,
government responsibility for jobs, aid to blacks, crime reduction, and environmental
regulation); the entire sample was asked to place Perot on the ideological scale. Thus
we are able to model a number of dierent candidate{specic variables. Below we rst
estimate a model which essentially replicates Alvarez and Nagler's model of the 1992
election, with only the ideological distance of the voter from each candidate. We then
estimate a second model which contains ideological distance and all of the issue distances
just listed. The measure of ideological or issue distance we employ is the squared dif-
ference between the respondent's self placement on the respective NES seven point issue
or ideological scale and the candidate's mean placement on the same scale by all of the
survey respondents.
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Each of the measures in Table 1 are included in the model as individual{level char-
acteristics. Thus, we have included measures of the respondent's opinion of the change
in their personal nances over the past year and their opinion on the change in the na-
tional economy during that same time. Both of these measures are coded with positive
evaluations as the high category. We include measures for opinions on whether both
welfare and social security should be increased, kept the same, or cut (both variables
were coded in that order | with the conservative answers the higher values). We also
included opinions on the Dole 15% tax cut (a binary variable coded such that agreement
with Dole on this issue was the high category). Additionally we include the respondent's
opinion of government health insurance (conservative answers were coded high on the
seven point scale). Last we measured respondents' opinions about abortion policy by
using responses from a question which asked respondents which of four abortion options
best represented their beliefs on abortion policy, with pro{choice coded high.
We also include a series of other measures which measure individual characteristics
which might have inuenced voter choice in the 1996 presidential election. We have
dummy variables for Republican and Democratic identication (with independents be-
ing the baseline category). Also, there are measures for the respondent's educational
attainment (years of schooling), gender (females were coded high), age (three dummy
variables), and region (dummy variables for West, South and East).
This specication of our multinomial probit models provides us with the means to
test competing propositions concerning the determinants of voter choice in the 1996
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presidential election. We use our estimates of the eects of economic perceptions to
understand how important the economy was in this presidential election. The estimates
on our ideological distance and issue distance variables give us the tools we need to
understand the eects of spatial placement of voters and candidates. Last, our estimates
of the eects of social, entitlement and taxation issues give us the ability to examine
these other explanations for voter choice in the 1996 presidential election campaign.
3.1 Multinomial Probit Estimates of the 1996 Election
In Table 3 we present the multinomial probit estimates of our model which includes the
ideological distance measure but not the specic issue distances. This model basically
serves to replicate Alvarez and Nagler's model of the 1992 election (Alvarez and Nagler
1995). In Table 4 we include the issue distance measures as well as the ideology measure.
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In each table, the parameter estimates in the left column give the coecients which
express the eect of each individual characteristic on the likelihood of the respondent
voting for Clinton relative to the likelihood of voting for Perot. The right column gives
coecients for the eect of each individual characteristic on the relative likelihood of
choosing Dole versus choosing Perot. The center column of estimates gives the coecient
estimates for the candidate{specic ideological or issue distances.
Tables 3 and 4 Go Here
In the ideological distance model (Table 3) we see rst that ideological distance is
negatively signed and is statistically signicant.
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This indicates that voters were less
likely to support candidates who were further from them ideologically, all other things
being equal. In the results for Clinton relative to Perot, we see that a number of other
coecients are statistically signicant. Not surprisingly we nd that Democrats were
more likely to vote for Clinton than Perot; also those who wanted to increase Social
Security expenditures and those who were opposed to Dole's tax cut were more likely
to support Clinton than Perot. We also nd that voters who were pro{choice were
more likely to vote for Clinton than were pro{life voters. And, in conrmation of our
hypothesis regarding the eects of the national economy on support for Clinton we see
that respondents' views on the national economy had a strong eect on support for
Clinton relative to Perot.
Turning to the results for Dole support in Table 3, we see that in this specication a
similar set of variables were strongly related to Dole support. On one hand we see that
Republicans were signicantly more likely to support Dole than Perot. We also nd that
both those who wanted to cut welfare benets and those who believed that the private
sector should supply health care coverage were more likely to support Dole. Last, we
nd that pro{life voters were signicantly more likely to support Dole.
We see very similar results in Table 4. Here we see that adding the issue distance
variables does improve our ability to understand the outcome of the 1996 presidential
election; in addition to ideological distance, both opposition to government services and
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opposition to environmental regulation were signicant and negatively related to support
for Clinton. As to the other substantively important predictors of support for Clinton
relative to Perot, we see that in this specication only Democratic partisanship and the
perceptions of voters about the state of the national economy are now signicantly related
to Clinton support relative to Perot. The coecients on social security, abortion, and
the tax cut are no longer signicant; and the tax cut coecient even changes sign. Thus
respondents did not necessarily use these issues to distinguish between Clinton and Perot.
However, looking at the coecients for Dole relative to Perot we see that voters did use
several of these issues in making their choice among the candidates. For Dole we see that
support for welfare cuts, pro{life beliefs, and support for private sector provision of health
care are signicant predictors of Dole voting. Beside a signicant eect for partisanship,
we see that the estimated impact of the 15% tax cut is statistically signicant in this
specication (signicance here is at the 90% level, with a one{tailed test).
We also see that a respondents' gender has no signicant eect on their vote choice
once we control for the issues and demographic variables included in our model. This
is consistent with recent work showing that the gender gap can be explained by issue
positions of voters and candidates, economic perceptions and partisanship (for discussion
of this literature see Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1997). This is a much dierent nding
than one would obtain only looking at the bivariate relationship between gender and vote
choice in Table 1.
These multinomial probit results also give us one way to assess the dierent expla-
nations for the 1996 presidential election. We nd support rst of all for the proposition
that the national economy had a strong eect on voter choice in this election. We also
nd support for the idea that relative spatial location of voters and candidates on ide-
ology and on selected issues (government services and environmental regulation) were
signicant predictors of candidate support. Last we see that voters' positions on a num-
ber of other issues | concerning changes in entitlement policy, in federal government
taxation, and abortion policy | were themselves signicant predictors of vote choice in
the 1996 presidential election.
3.2 The Magnitude of the Eects of the Independent Variables
Since these estimated eects in the multinomial probit model translate into individual
probabilities of candidate support in a complex and nonlinear manner, we need to trans-
form these coecient estimates into probabilities to help in our interpretation of the
relative magnitude of each type of eect on this election. Thus, we present \rst dier-
ence" estimates in Table 5. We rst set all of the independent variables to their sample
mode or mean values.
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For each of the independent variables of interest here, we compute
predicted probabilities of a voter choosing Clinton, Dole and Perot, for dierent values
of specic independent variables. We rst give the estimated probability for the high
value of the variable, followed by the same probability of candidate support for the low
value of the independent variable. The last entry for each specic independent variable
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is the dierence between these two probability estimates. This is a measure of the eect
of changes in the variable.
Table 5 Goes Here
The rst two entries in Table 5 show how much more important the state of the
national economy was in determining voter choice in 1996 than were perceptions of per-
sonal nances. Changes in a respondent's perception of their personal nances produced
very slight changes in the probability that the hypothetical voter would support each
of the candidates. However, changes in perceptions of the national economy produced
very large changes in both Clinton and Dole support. The hypothetical voter was .38
more likely to support Clinton if they saw the national economy as better rather than
worse; the hypothetical voter was .31 more likely to support Dole if they saw the national
economy as worse, not better.
Next, we see from Table 5 that opinions on cuts in both entitlement programs had
strong impacts on candidate support. A voter who wanted to increase either program
would be .14 or .08 more likely to support Clinton (Social Security and welfare, respec-
tively). But a voter who wanted to cut either program was more likely to support Dole
than a voter who wanted increases in either program (.08 and .18 more likely for Social
Security and welfare, respectively). These two issues had less of an impact on voting for
Perot, since those wanting cuts in Social Security were more likely to vote for Perot than
those wanting increases in that entitlement program; while voters who wanted increases
in welfare programs were .10 more likely to vote for Perot than those wanting welfare
program cuts.
Dole did receive some support from his 15% tax cut proposal. Those who favored the
tax cut were .12 more likely to support Dole than those who opposed it. Opposing the
tax cut led voters to support Clinton by only .07 more than those who supported the
tax cut. Similarly, opposing the tax cut led voters to be slightly more likely to support
Perot (.05) than those who supported the 15% tax cut.
Furthermore, both abortion and health insurance beliefs had strong eects in the
1996 election. Pro{choice beliefs made our hypothetical voter .30 more likely to support
Clinton than pro{life voters. Pro{life beliefs made voters .33 more likely to support Dole
than pro{choice voters. Those who wanted the government to provide health insurance
were .12 more likely to support Clinton than those who wanted the private sector to
provide health insurance. The opposite relationship is seen for Dole; our hypothetical
voter was .25 more likely to vote for Dole if they believed that the private sector should
provide health care coverage and not the government.
4 Eects of Candidate Spatial Locations
The results presented in Table 5 demonstrated that respondents' views of the issues
played a strong role in determining voter choice in the 1996 presidential election. Here
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we want to pursue a dierent question about the importance of issues in this election
by focusing on where the candidates were located on the six issues in our analysis and
ideology. We are also interested here in trying to determine what the ideal location was
for each candidate on each of these issues and on the ideological scale.
To answer these questions we follow a simulation procedure used by Alvarez and
Nagler in their analysis of the 1992 election (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). To determine
the eects of candidate behavior with regard to issue and ideological positioning, we
simulate the eect of each candidate moving across the issue or ideological space, holding
the positions of the other two candidates xed. In this simulation, we compute the
probability of each respondent voting for each of the three candidates as we move the
candidate of interest across the issue or ideological space, from 1 to 7, by increments
of .02. We then aggregate the estimated probabilities from all respondents for each
candidate at each possible position. This gives us estimated vote shares at each possible
position.
We begin our analysis by presenting graphically these results for ideological place-
ments. The results given in Figures 1-3 show the predicted vote share of each candidate
(on the vertical axis) as Clinton (Figure 1), Dole (Figure 2) and Perot (Figure 3) are
moved across the ideological space. Beginning with Figure 1, what is striking to note is
that Clinton actually had a fair amount of exibility in where he could locate himself in
the ideological space. The maximum of his vote share curve occurs when he is located at
4.24 on the seven point scale, where he could have received as high a vote share as 50.3%;
however, respondents actually perceived Clinton to be at 3.15, where he gets 48.7% of
the vote. Thus, while Clinton was not located very far from his ideal ideological posi-
tion, he could have shifted slightly further to the right and obtained more votes, ceteris
paribus. He could have moved as far left as 2.03 before losing the election, holding all
else constant.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 go here
Even more striking, though, are the results presented in Figures 2 (Dole) and 3
(Perot). There we see that neither candidate could have found an ideological position
which could have resulted in a dierent election outcome. Dole was perceived by respon-
dents to be located at 5.15 on this ideological scale, where he received 41.4% of the vote.
We calculate his optimal position to be 4.60, just slightly to the left of his actual position,
where he could have received just a slightly greater vote share (41.7%). Virtually the
same story holds for Perot, since at no ideological position does he come close to even
beating Dole. We calculate from our model that Perot's optimal position was 4.36, where
he could have received 9.9% of the total vote | which is equivalent to the 9.9% of the
vote share he obtained from his actual position (4.49).
We performed similar analyses for all of the remaining placement issues. These, as
well as the analysis of ideology, are presented in summary form in Table 6. The rst three
lines of this table provide a summary of the results for ideology, which we just discussed.
The rst column of numbers gives each candidate's actual position on ideology or each
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issue. The next column gives the candidate's vote share in our sample. The third column
gives the computed position for the candidate to be at where he would maximize his vote
share. And the fourth column gives the candidate's predicted vote share if he moved
to his optimal position. The nal column gives the increase in vote share based on
movement to the optimal position.
Table 6 goes here
We can see from the results in Table 6 that movement on any one issue would not
have appreciably helped any of the candidates. Recall that the statistically signicant
issue distance parameters in our multinomial probit model were government services and
environmental regulation. For even these two issues, where we estimated the largest
eects on voter preference, it is clear that the candidates were not far from their optimal
positions. None of the three candidates could have obtained more that a percentage or
two of additional vote share by moving to their optimal position on any of these particular
issues.
However, this does not imply that if these three candidates could have determined
their optimal position on all of these issues and ideology that they could not have sig-
nicantly improved their vote shares. In Table 7 we use the optimal placements we just
calculated above to determine what the maximal change in vote share would have been
if any one of these candidates could have moved to their issue and ideological optimum,
ceteris paribus.
Table 7 goes here
In Table 7 we see that there could have been some dramatic changes in candidate vote
shares if each of the candidates had moved to their optimal positions, holding the other
candidates constant. Clinton, for example, could have increased his vote share a full
ve percent by simultaneously moving to his optimal position on all issues and ideology.
Also, notice that Dole would have increased his vote share by almost three percent by
moving to his optimal location. The biggest increase is seen for Perot, whose vote share
would have jumped over ve percent had he been able to simultaneously move to his
optimal ideological and issue location.
Thus, this evidence leads us to conclude that in general, the election was not de-
termined by the position of the candidates in the ideological and issue space. On an
issue{by{issue basis, we could nd little support for the idea that any of the candidates
were very far from their ideal positions. And when we moved each candidate to their
ideological and issue optimal placements simultaneously, we did see some change in the
vote shares of each candidate, but not enough change to have signicantly altered the
outcome of the 1996 presidential election.
12
5 Eects of the Economy
This leads us to the other major factor which inuenced voter behavior in the 1996
election | economic perceptions. Our methodology gives us the ability to examine
another important counterfactual question, following the sort of questions Alvarez and
Nagler (1995) asked about the 1992 presidential election. In particular, what if the state
of the national economy had been signicantly dierent in 1996? Would Dole have been
able to win the 1996 election if voters perceived the national economy and their own
personal nances in the same negative light in 1996 as they had in 1992?
In Table 8 we present the frequency of responses to both of the two major survey
questions regarding the economy, taken from the 1988, 1992 and 1996 NES. What we
nd about the aggregate distributions of opinions about personal nances in 1996 is that
they were remarkably similar to those in 1988. While the distribution of opinions about
changes in personal nance are virtually identical in 1988 and 1996, the assessments of
the national economy are, on balance, slightly more favorable in 1996 than in 1988. But
what actually is most important to observe about the results in Table 8 is how dierent
1992 was relative to both 1988 and 1996. There is no question, based on these survey
responses, that the electorate was in a sour economic mood in 1992, which is a large part
of the story behind Bush's loss (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). The opinions about the change
in personal nances are somewhat more negative in 1992 than in either of the other years,
but certainly it is clear that the perceptions of the national economy were dramatically
dierent in 1992 than in 1996 or 1988. A full 72% of American voters believed the
national economy had grown worse during the last year of Bush's administration.
Table 8 goes here
So, while we have found in our multinomial probit results that the national economy
had a strong eect in returning Clinton to oce in 1996, what would have happened if
the economy had been performing poorly in the year leading up to this election? More
specically, what might the results have been if the election in 1996 were held under the
same economic conditions which helped to push Clinton to victory in 1992? To provide
an answer to this question, we provide counterfactual estimates of candidate vote shares
under three dierent scenarios in Table 9. There, we simulate these hypothetical election
outcomes by randomly reassigning opinions of the economy to the 1996 respondents so
that the aggregate distributions of opinions about the economy matched the distributions
of opinion about the economy held by respondents in 1992. This allows us to compute the
probability of voting for each candidate using these hypothetical values for the economic
perception variables, and the respondents' actual values for all of the other variables.
Table 9 goes here
In Table 9 we see that if voters had seen their personal nances in 1996 to be the
same as respondents had in 1992 it would not have changed the election outcome. But
in the third row of this table, it is clear that had the national economy been seen by
voters as being as bad in 1996 as it was in 1992, Clinton would have lost this election by a
large margin. Not only could Clinton have lost to Dole by a considerable margin (about
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ten percentage points), Perot's vote share would have risen to just under 15%. Thus,
the conclusion is inescapable; just as the weak economy in 1992 doomed the incumbent
president to retirement, the strong economy in 1996 granted another incumbent president
four more years in oce.
6 The Impact of Candidate Perot
In 1992, when Perot received roughly 20% of the popular vote, it was a very important
question as to whether his presence in the election campaign hurt Bush more than Clinton.
Alvarez and Nagler (1995) showed that Perot drew support from both Bush and Clinton
almost equally, taking slightly more votes from Bush than from Clinton. This led them
to make a strong substantive claim about the 1992 election, which was that despite the
fact that Perot's presence slightly increased Clinton's victory margin, Bush would still
have lost the 1992 election. In 1996 Perot captured about 10% of all the votes cast,
which indicates that he was still a considerable force on the national political scene. If
these voters had not been presented with a choice of Perot, and if they had still turned
out to vote in this election, who would they have cast ballots for? And perhaps more
importantly, could Dole have beaten Clinton in a Perot{free political environment?
Our multinomial probit model gives us one way to try to answer this question. We
exclude Perot from the choice set by simply computing the two party vote share under the
assumption that each voter would simply cast their vote for Clinton or Dole, depending on
which candidate they had the greatest utility for. Using this approach, we estimate a two
party vote breakdown of 52.4% for Clinton and 47.6% for Dole, a margin of just under ve
percent. Next we reproduce our counterfactual simulations for both issue and economic
factors with Perot excluded from the choice set. We examine how much dierent the two
party vote share might have been if each candidate could have positioned themselves at
their optimal position (Table 10), and under the scenario that the economy in 1996 was
as bad as it was in 1992 (Table 11). In Table 10 we place Clinton at what would be
his optimal position on each of the seven issues and ideology | in a two candidate race
| and compute the vote shares of Clinton and Dole. We then do the same for Dole.
We see that if Clinton were to move to his optimal position on ideology or any of the
issues that he would gain a percentage or two over Dole. But, if Clinton were to move
simultaneously to his optimal position on ideology and all of the issues he could have
swept to a very large victory (57.1% to 42.9%).
Tables 10 and 11 go here
On an issue{by{issue basis, we also do not see Dole gaining much ground on Clinton.
Yet in the end, if Dole had been able to position himself at his optimal position on
ideology and all of the issues he could have gotten himself into a 49.7% versus 50.3%
race. So, without Perot in the mix and by being slightly closer to the median voter on
ideology and all of these dierent issues, Dole could have brought himself to a virtual
tie with Clinton. This is much dierent than the result of the three-way simulations
presented in Table 7.
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Next, though, what about the eect of the economy in Perot's absence? We present
in Table 11 a counterfactual simulation in which we examine the same three hypothetical
scenarios as earlier in this paper (setting the electorate's aggregate economic opinions
in 1996 to match those in 1992), but in a situation where Perot is on the sidelines. We
see that the eects of personal nances are very slight, just as in the three candidate
race. But we see that were the national economy as bad in 1996 as it was in 1992, and if
Perot were not running in the election, Dole would have easily won the 1996 presidential
election, by roughly a seven percent margin.
7 Conclusions and Discussion
There are at least three policy issues or areas outside of economic performance that have
been asserted to have helped reelect Clinton in 1996. First, to the extent that he had
an issue based campaign, it is clear that a Democratic tactic was to scare voters into
thinking that the Republicans would destroy Social Security. We have no measure of
how eective the campaign tactic was in convincing voters of the distinction between the
candidates on the issue. But our results fail to show that respondents' views on Social
Security had any statistically signicant impact on their probability of voting for Clinton
| despite the predictable support for Clinton over Dole when we examine the vote choice
of voters who support social security in a bivariate comparison.
Second, Clinton ran as a \New Democrat" in 1992, and attempted to sharpen that
image for the 1996 race by signing the welfare bill. However, it is clear based on re-
spondents' perception of Clinton's position on the ideological scale that he never really
convinced the voters that he was a \New Democrat." And while Clinton could not have
moved arbitrarily far to the left on the ideological scale and still won the election, he
could have moved quite a bit to the left.
Third, abortion was again a crucial issue distinguishing the Republican and Demo-
cratic candidates. A voter's position on abortion was also a major determinant of how
they voted. Thus the emergence of the religious right as a force in Republican primary
politics has clearly had an impact on presidential elections as the likelihood of the Repub-
licans nominating a candidate who is not pro-life is very slim, and this means that they
will continue to send out presidential nominees who hold the minority view on a divisive
issue. Our analysis has shown that just as in 1992, the abortion position taken by the
Republican presidential candidate clearly is harming their chances for general election
victory.
But, simply put, again it was the economy, stupid. The overwhelming impact of the
economy in 1992 was not just a uke, nor was it simply a byproduct of the particu-
larly poor economic circumstances. In 1996 the election was contested under economic
circumstances very favorable to the incumbent and voters again relied heavily on their
economic perceptions in choosing whom to cast their votes for. Four years into his presi-
dency Clinton had no major legislative victories to peddle; in fact, he had been defeated
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on the centerpiece of his legislative program | health care reform. In oce, Clinton
had started o pursuing an unpopular proposal on gays in the military, lurched into his
health-care defeat, then presided over his party's losing the House for the rst time in 40
years, which led to a welfare bill that most people felt he acceded to simply for political
expediency. Yet Clinton was still able to easily retain his oce.
The dominance of economic perceptions over issues has interesting normative impli-
cations for politics. The retrospective model of voting has suggested that voters reward
or punish incumbents for economic performance, and that this is a good thing since eco-
nomic performance is observable and tangible. However, if incumbents have little control
over short-term economic performance, voters are choosing candidates essentially at ran-
dom. This suggests candidates have tremendous freedom to shirk in the policy areas over
which they do exert considerable inuence. If the economy is good the incumbent will
be retained in oce. If the economy is bad, having all the correct positions on the issues
may not be sucient to retain the oce. Thus, when voters use retrospective evalua-
tions of national economic performance as their primary decision criteria in presidential
elections, they might be losing their ability to insure that they eventually achieve the
non{economic policy outcomes they desire.
We temper this conclusion with another inference we can draw from our analysis. We
have shown that Dole's ability to inuence his vote-share by changing his position on
the issues was severely limited by the presence of a third candidate (Ross Perot). This
suggests that in a \crowded issue space" candidates have little room to maneuver for in-
creased votes. We view examining how this shapes politics in the multiparty democracies
of Europe relative to the usual two-party politics of the United States is a crucial area
of future research.
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Notes
1
In this table we report the row percentages, so while the rows will sum to 100% the
columns will not. Armed with the number of respondents in each cell, interested readers
can calculate the column percentages.
2
We use Bush and Clinton as the candidates in 1994.
3
Other techniques could be used to estimate a multivariate model of the 1996 pres-
idential election: estimate binomial choice models, ordinal models, or multinomial logit
models. Each of these techniques is awed for estimating models of multicandidate elec-
tions (Alvarez 1997; Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1997).
4
Below we present results which estimate two of the three free error covariance ele-
ments, consistent with the standard results in the literature on the identication of these
model parameters (Alvarez and Nagler 1997; Bolduc 1992; Bunch 1991; Keane 1992).
5
Since the issue placement questions for Perot were asked only to survey respondents
in the rst two sample replicates, when we calculate the position of Perot on each of
these issues we do so using only respondents from these rst two sample replicates.
6
We estimated a model which included only the issue distance parameters but we do
not present that here. The results are substantively equivalent.
7
Both of these multinomial probit models t the data quite well. The model including
issues and ideology produces a predicted three candidate outcome of 48.8% for Clinton,
41.4% for Dole and 9.9% for Perot; the actual estimation sample had a three candidate
split of 46.7% for Clinton, 44.8% for Dole and 8.4% for Perot. As for the individual vote
predictions, we correctly classied 82.2% of the voters in our sample. More specically,
of the people who voted for each candidate, we we correctly predicted 83.6% of the
Clinton voters, 81.7% of the Dole voters, and 50.0% of the Perot voters. In the model
including only ideology (Table 3) we estimate one error correlation parameter (
CP
)
which is statistically signicant at the p=.05 level (one{tailed test). This indicates that
the \independence of irrelevant alternatives" assumption is violated in this case (Alvarez
and Nagler 1997). However, in the second model (Table 4) we see that this estimated
error correlation becomes statistically insignicant, despite begin of almost the same
magnitude as in the rst multinomial probit model. In the second model, the coecient
on the other error correlation which we estimate (
DP
), while statistically insignicant,
drops to near zero. There are two dierent possible explanations for these dierent error
correlation estimates across the two multinomial probit models. One explanation could
be that we have a better specication when we include issues and ideology into our
multinomial probit model; it is possible that the information contained in the six issue
distance parameters leads to the signicant error correlation in the ideology{only model,
since this information is excluded from the model in Table 3. The second explanation
centers on the fact that we lose 160 cases when we include the six issues in our multinomial
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probit model; the loss of eciency associated with these missing cases in the second model
might produce the larger standard error associated with the estimate of 
CP
in Table 4.
8
Each of the issue and ideological distance variables were set to their sample mean
values. We used more substantively plausible values for the other demographic and issue
preference variables; the modal respondent was male, older than 60, lived in the south,
had a high school education, was politically independent, thought that welfare should
be cut but social security should remain constant, saw the national economy as better
but their personal nances as unchanged, did not support the Dole 15% tax cut, was
middle{of{the road on government support for health care, and thought that abortion
should be permitted only in limited situations.
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Table 1: Vote Choice in the 1996 Election
Perot Dole Clinton
% N % N % N
Personal nances
Worse 9.1% 23 47.2% 119 43.7% 110
Same 5.8% 22 43.7% 166 50.5% 192
Better 7.5% 36 30.8% 148 61.8% 297
National economy
Worse 13.4% 21 56.7% 89 29.9% 47
Same 6.6% 31 50.1% 235 43.3% 203
Better 6.0% 29 22.6% 109 71.4% 345
Party identication
Republican 6.7% 32 79.3% 380 14.0% 67
Independent 19.6% 11 41.1% 23 39.3% 22
Democrat 6.7% 39 5.3% 31 87.9% 510
Vote in 1992
Voted 7.1% 72 39.6% 402 53.4% 542
Did not vote 10.5% 10 31.6% 30 57.9% 55
Gender
Men 8.9% 46 44.6% 230 46.5% 240
Women 6.0% 36 34.0% 204 60% 360
Abortion
Pro-life 7.0% 8 54.8% 63 38.3% 44
Only rape 6.8% 23 52.2% 177 41% 139
When needed 9.5% 17 39.1% 70 51.4% 92
Pro-choice 7.3% 34 24.8% 115 67.8% 314
Welfare
Cut 7.0% 48 51.7% 353 41.3% 282
Keep the same 7.9% 26 21.5% 71 70.6% 233
Increase 8.6% 8 7.5% 7 83.9% 78
Social security
Cut 7.8% 6 68.8% 53 23.4% 18
Keep the same 7.7% 43 44.8% 251 47.5% 266
Increase 7.0% 33 26.9% 127 66.1% 312
15% tax cut
Favor 7.0% 10 67.1% 96 25.9% 37
Oppose 7.4% 72 34.7% 338 57.9% 563
Entire sample 7.3% 82 38.9% 434 53.8% 600
Note: Percentages listed are row percentages.
a
These numbers are based on all respondents who answered each question listed in
column one, as well as reporting their vote choice.
Table 2: Candidate and Voter Ideological Placements
1988 1992 1994 1996
Respondent Self- Placement 4.37 4.21 4.22 4.33
Republican Candidate
a
5.11 5.05 5.08 5.15
Republican Candidate Distance
b
1.24 1.31 1.33 1.30
Democratic Candidate
a
3.24 3.19 3.09 3.15
Democratic Candidate Distance
b
1.50 1.46 1.53 1.52
Perot
a
4.31 4.34 4.49
Perot Distance
b
1.15 1.18 1.16
a
Mean placement of the candidate by all respondents.
In 1994 Bush is the Republican candidate.
b
Mean distance between respondents and the candidate's
mean placement by all respondents.
Table 3: Multinomial Probit Coecients, Ideological Distance Model
Perot Coecients Normalized to Zero
Independent Coecients for
Variables Clinton Dole
Ideological distance -.08*
.03
Constant -1.67* -1.30**
.66 .99
Female .12 .25**
.14 .19
Age: 18{29 -.45** -.68**
.32 .52
Age: 30{44 -.61* -.50
.27 .42
Age: 45{59 -.12 -.24
.22 .22
West .30** -.14
.21 .19
South .17 -.13
.18 .17
East .26 -.40**
.25 .27
Increase Welfare .09 -.45*
.16 .27
Increase Social Security .32* .03
.13 .12
Education .40 1.95*
.84 1.35
Personal Finance Improved .04 .08
.10 .12
National Economy Improved .50* -.20
.18 .17
Democrat 1.09* -.81**
.46 .50
Republican -.07 .72**
.44 .52
Pro-Choice Abortion .15** -.23**
.11 .16
Approve 15% Tax Cut -.27** .28
.19 .26
Oppose Govt Health Ins -.02 .15**
.07 .10

DP
.55
.59

CP
.49*
.28
Number of Observations 847
Log Likelihood -395.08

Signicant at p = .05 level (1-tailed test)

Signicant at p = .10 level (1-tailed test).
Table 4: Multinomial Probit Coecients, Issue and Ideological Distance Model
Perot Coecients Normalized to Zero
Independent Coecients for
Variables Clinton Dole
Gov't services -.05*
.02
Defense spending -.04
.06
Gov't jobs -.02
.02
Aid to blacks -.01
.02
Crime reduction .00
.02
Environmental regulation -.06*
.03
Ideology -.09*
.03
Constant -2.78* -1.80**
1.28 1.27
Female .11 .33
.20 .26
Age: 18{29 -.80* -.97**
.48 .62
Age: 30{44 -1.06* -.65**
.38 .48
Age: 45{59 -.33 -.28
.28 .33
West .40** .10
.29 .34
South .27 -.13
.24 .28
East .22 -.44
.30 .36
Table 4 continued
Multinomial Probit Coecients, Issue and Ideological Distance Model
Perot Coecients Normalized to Zero
Independent Coecients for
Variables Clinton Dole
Increase Welfare -.11 -.45*
.17 .25
Increase Social Security .23 .03
.19 .20
Education 1.20 2.56*
1.02 1.40
Personal Finance Improved .09 .16
.13 .18
National Economy Improved .57* -.21
.28 .23
Democrat 1.16* -.98**
.65 .61
Republican .51 .99**
.56 .70
Pro-Choice Abortion .11 -.32*
.15 .19
Approve 15% Tax Cut .11 .49**
.31 .35
Oppose Govt Health Ins .05 .19*
.08 .11

DP
.02
1.04

CP
.42
.45
Number of Observations 687
Log Likelihood -309.85

Signicant at p = .05 level (1-tailed test)

Signicant at p = .10 level (1-tailed test).
Table 5: Eects of Economics and Issues in 1996
Probability of Voting for
Clinton Dole Perot
Personal nance
Better .49 .39 .11
Worse .50 .34 .16
Dierence -.01 .05 -.05
National economy
Better .49 .37 .14
Worse .11 .68 .21
Dierence .38 -.31 -.07
Social security
Increase .56 .33 .11
Cut .42 .41 .17
Dierence .14 -.08 -.06
Welfare
Increase .57 .19 .24
Cut .49 .37 .14
Dierence .08 -.18 .10
15% tax cut
Favor .42 .49 .09
Oppose .49 .37 .14
Dierence -.07 .12 -.05
Abortion
Pro-choice .59 .27 .14
Pro-life .29 .60 .11
Dierence .30 -.33 .03
Health insurance
Government .54 .25 .21
Private sector .42 .50 .08
Dierence .12 -.25 .13
Baseline Probability .49 .37 .14
Estimated probabilities were calculated with the other variables set to their mean or
mode value.
Table 6: Vote Shares and Optimal Spatial Locations
Actual Actual Optimal Optimal Vote
Issue Candidate Position Vote Position Vote Increase
Ideology
Clinton 3.15 48.7% 4.24 50.3% 0.6%
Dole 5.15 41.4% 4.60 41.7% 0.3%
Perot 4.49 9.9% 4.36 9.9% 0.0%
Gov't services
Clinton 4.91 48.7% 3.88 49.6% 0.9%
Dole 3.15 41.4% 3.52 41.5% 0.1%
Perot 2.94 10.1% 3.76 10.3% 0.2%
Defense spending
Clinton 3.95 48.8% 4.00 48.8% 0.0%
Dole 4.65 41.4% 4.12 41.5% 0.1%
Perot 3.83 9.9% 3.88 10.1% 0.2%
Jobs
Clinton 3.27 48.7% 4.48 49.1% 0.4%
Dole 5.09 41.4% 4.90 41.4% 0.0%
Perot 5.20 9.9% 4.60 10.0% 0.1%
Aid to blacks
Clinton 3.32 48.7% 4.84 49.1% 0.4%
Dole 5.00 41.4% 5.20 41.4% 0.0%
Perot 2.26 9.9% 5.08 11.0% 1.1%
Crime reduction
Clinton 3.70 48.7% 1.00 49.9% 1.2%
Dole 5.10 41.4% 1.00 42.6% 1.2%
Perot 5.10 9.9% 1.00 11.1% 1.2%
Environmental regulation
Clinton 3.24 48.7% 3.40 48.7% 0.0%
Dole 4.57 41.4% 3.52 42.5% 1.1%
Perot 4.73 9.9% 3.28 18.8% 8.9%
Table 7: Estimated Vote Shares with Candidates at Optimal Locations on All Issues and
Ideology
Candidate Vote Shares
Clinton Dole Perot
Clinton at Optimal Position 53.7 37.8 8.3
Dole at Optimal Position 46.8 43.8 9.3
Perot at Optimal Position 44.9 40.1 15.1
Actual Positions 48.7 41.4 9.9
Table 8: Comparative Economic Opinions, 1988{96
Personal nances
1988 1992 1996
Opinion N Percent N Percent N Percent
Better 849 42.4 749 30.3 747 43.8
Same 664 32.8 866 35.0 542 31.8
Worse 502 24.8 859 34.7 418 24.5
National economy
1988 1992 1996
Opinion N Percent N Percent N Percent
Better 368 18.8 113 4.6 670 39.5
Same 978 50.0 567 23.1 746 43.9
Worse 610 31.2 1777 72.3 282 16.6
Table 9: Comparative Economic Opinion Eects, 1992{96
Candidate Vote Shares
Distribution of Respondents' Perceptions of Economy Clinton Dole Perot
1996 Baseline 48.7 41.4 9.9
1992 Personal nances Only 48.6 41.2 10.1
1992 National economy Only 37.7 47.8 14.5
1992 Personal nances and National Economy 37.4 47.7 14.9
Table 10: Two Party Vote Shares at Optimal Spatial Locations
Candidate vote shares
Clinton Dole
Clinton at optimum:
Ideology 54.2 45.8
Gov't services 53.3 46.7
Defense spending 53.0 47.1
Jobs 52.7 42.3
Aid to blacks 53.2 46.8
Crime reduction 53.7 46.3
Environmental regulation 52.4 47.3
All issues 57.1 42.9
Dole at optimum:
Ideology 52.0 48.0
Gov't services 52.2 47.8
Defense spending 52.2 47.8
Jobs 52.4 47.6
Aid to blacks 52.3 47.7
Crime reduction 52.0 48.0
Environmental regulation 52.0 48.1
All issues 50.3 49.7
Baseline two party vote share 52.4 47.6
Table 11: Two Party Vote Shares Under Dierent Economic Conditions
Candidate vote shares
Comparison Clinton Dole
Personal nances only 52.6 47.4
National economy only 46.6 53.4
Both 46.4 53.6
Baseline 52.4 47.6
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Figure 1
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Note: \A" stands for Clinton's Actual position on the ideological scale;
\O" stands for Clinton's estimated Optimal position on the ideological
scale.
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Note: \A" stands for Clinton's Actual position on the ideological scale;
\O" stands for Clinton's estimated Optimal position on the ideological
scale.
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Figure 3
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Note: \A" stands for Clinton's Actual position on the ideological scale;
\O" stands for Clinton's estimated Optimal position on the ideological
scale.
